Abstract-Ad hoc networks employ a decentralized unstructured networking model that relies on node cooperation for key network functionalities such as routing and medium access. In this paper, we develop and evaluate a model based on the Sequential Probability Ratio Test to characterize how nodes can differentiate between routes that include misbehaving nodes (infected routes) and routes that do not. An advantage of the model is that the number of observations required to evaluate a route need not be determined in advance.
INTRODUCTION
Ad hoc networks typically consist of wireless batteryoperated nodes that dynamically form a communication network without the use of existing infrastructure or centralized administration.
This self-organizing networking model requires cooperation among nodes to support key network functionalities such as medium access and routing. In the routing functionality, nodes cooperate in route discovery to find operational routes to destinations outside their transmission range, and participate in packet forwarding to deliver packets to these destinations. If nodes refuse to cooperate or tamper with the route discovery function, operational routes may not be found. If nodes refuse to cooperate with respect to the forwarding function, end-to-end packet delivery may not be possible. Such uncooperative behavior (which we characterize as misbehavior) can greatly degrade network performance and may even result in total communication breakdown. Consequently, it is important for both security and performance reasons to expose misbehaving nodes to limit the scope of their negative impact on network survivability.
Our objective in this paper is to accurately detect misbehavior with respect to the routing functionality in ad hoc networks. Based on the Sequential Probability Ratio Test (SPRT) [1] we develop a model to characterize how nodes differentiate between infected routes (routes that include misbehaving nodes) and clean routes (routes that do not include misbehaving nodes). A merit of SPRTs is that the number of observations required to test statistical hypotheses need not be determined in advance. This suits well the nature of ad hoc networks where the number of observations needed to make a decision about a node's behavior (i.e. identify it as cooperative or misbehaving) is not known apriori. Further, the number of observations used in SPRTs is greatly reduced (by 50% in most cases) when compared to other methods based on a fixed number of observations [1] . This allows for prompt decision making, which is a desirable characteristic in network security algorithms in order to limit the scope of damage to the network.
In order to detect misbehaving nodes in infected routes identified by the SPRT test, we outline a centralized and a localized approach. We evaluate the ability of each to detect misbehaving nodes and the false positives each incurs. We conclude that the localized approach performs better. A localized approach is also more appropriate due to the selforganizing, decentralized nature of ad hoc networks.
Our contribution in this work is threefold. First, we show that a sequential probability ratio test can be devised to clearly distinguish between infected routes and clean routes. Second, we demonstrate that a realization of the test that does not assume the same level of knowledge as the theoretical model can achieve high accuracy. Third, we show that localized approaches can be effective in identifying misbehaving nodes.
II. SCOPE We assume that all nodes in the network are insider nodes, i.e. there is an authentication mechanism in place whereby a node can authenticate the source of packets it receives. Hence, nodes cannot forge packets. Each node has a unique identity and is not able to masquerade other nodes' identities or create new identities. We assume that links are bi-directional, which is a requirement of many existing MAC protocols such as the one adopted in IEEE 802.11 [2] . Nodes communicate over the wireless channel. We consider a communication environment where detection and isolation of misbehaving nodes is crucial to the survival of the network. Typically, this is the case in environments where the negative impact of node misbehavior on the network performance is much greater than the impact of fluctuations in channel conditions. We classify node behavior with respect to the routing functionality at the network layer into cooperative or misbehaving. Cooperative nodes do not deliberately drop packets forwarded through them or tamper with routing information. Misbehaving nodes are of one of two types, selfish or malicious nodes. Selfishness is intentional passive misbehavior, where a node chooses not to fully participate in the packet forwarding functionality because it is concerned for its resources. Hence, a selfish node drops some or all packets forwarded through it. We stress that selfishness is passive behavior where nodes are motivated only by their self-interest in conserving their resources. Hence, selfish nodes do not collude with each other or exert additional effort to camouflage their behavior such as slander attacks. Maliciousness, on the other hand, is intentional active misbehavior, where a node's aim is to deliberately disrupt the network. A malicious node is capable of launching blackhole or greyhole attacks [3] . Other classes of outsider attacks or insider node misbehavior at layers other than the network layer are outside the scope of this paper.
The impact of malicious node misbehavior is usually greater than that of selfish node misbehavior. A mechanism that is capable of identifying passive selfish node misbehavior should be able to identify certain types of malicious node misbehavior faster, due to the more aggressive nature of the latter. We focus on selfish misbehavior, primarily considering nodes that misbehave at the network layer by dropping some or all packets forwarded through them. Much of the analysis and design described here, however, also applies to certain types of blackhole and greyhole malicious attacks. This paper is organized as follows. In section III we introduce the network model. In section IV we present the SPRT for detection of infected routes and evaluate its accuracy in section V. In section VI, we introduce and compare two approaches for the detection of misbehaving nodes. In section VII we discuss related work and we conclude in section VIII. Packet drops occur due to two classes of factors: node misbehavior (one or more nodes along a route act selfishly, dropping packets); and network environment factors (under which we include congestion at the network layer, contention at the data link layer, physical communication impairments such as fading, etc.). Let drop P represent the probability that a data packet will be dropped due to network environment factors. For simplicity of presentation, we assume that all nodes N ∈ i will experience the same dropping probability due to environmental factors. The extension to the model to consider different drop probabilities at different nodes is straightforward. As for packet drops due to misbehavior in the network, we assume that each selfish node M ∈ i will drop a data packet forwarded through it with probability selfish P . We consider a communication environment where detection and isolation of misbehaving nodes is crucial to the survival of the network. Typically, this is the case when the negative impact of node selfishness (modeled as selfish P ) on network performance is much greater than deteriorating channel and/or network conditions (modeled as drop P ).
Consider, for now, symmetric routes in the network (we recognize the existence of asymmetric routes; as we will see later, as long as a reasonable proportion of all routes is symmetric, it is possible to accurately detect infected routes and misbehaving nodes). Define } ,...,
as an ordered set of nodes representing the route from source node
is the number of hops on the route). Let the ordering relationship on 
is the number of hops on
; otherwise it is "clean."
We assume some mechanism is available to provide feedback on end to end packet delivery. If a reliable transport layer protocol such as TCP is adopted, this feedback is provided at the transport layer in the form of TCP acknowledgements.
Otherwise, application layer acknowledgements could be used. We make an additional observation
IV. DETECTION OF INFECTED ROUTES

A. Overview of Sequential Probability Ratio Test (SPRT)
. It was shown in [1] that the values of A and B are bounded by observations the system will need to make before making a decision of 1 H or 0 H .
B. Sequential Probability Ratio Test for Detection of Infected Routes
In this section we define our model for detection of infected routes. The mathematical formulation of the model considers routes to be symmetric. While we recognize the existence of asymmetric routes, we will later see that as long as a reasonable proportion of routes are symmetric our model works well, achieving high accuracy in detection of infected routes. We also note that ad hoc routing protocols typically attempt to construct routes that are symmetric [4, 5] .
Let 1 H be the hypothesis that a given route is infected and 0 H be the hypothesis that the route is clean. We need to identify which hypothesis holds. As mentioned earlier, we assume some mechanism is available to provide feedback on end to end packet delivery. If TCP is adopted, we use packet ACKnowledgements as observations of successful packetdelivery events and packet RETransmissions as observations of failed packet-delivery events. Let ) , ( 
Hence, given observation n x at node i h about route
If ACK x n == :
If RET x n == :
V. MODEL EVALUATION
We now evaluate the model discussed in the previous section to assess its ability to accurately distinguish between infected and clean routes. We realize an implementation of the model that does not require perfect knowledge of drop P ,
, or the exact number of hops on a route, and implement it using ns-2 to evaluate its accuracy.
A. Model Implementation
We realize an implementation of the model that estimates model parameters as follows: 
The number of hops from a node to a route's destination is available to the node in its routing table. The number of hops from a route's destination to a node may not be known with certainty. A first order approximation is to assume that the total number of hops on the route = 2 * the number of hops on the forward route.
We consider that some routes may be constructed asymmetrically by the routing protocol.
An evaluation record ) , ( 
B. Evaluation
In this section we evaluate our model implementation. Our goal is to assess the ability of the model implementation to accurately distinguish between infected and clean routes given its estimation of the model's parameters. Since
is an important model parameter whose value is set according to the network objective, we also evaluate how the increase in This full text paper was peer reviewed at the direction of IEEE Communications Society subject matter experts for publication in the ICC 2007 proceedings.
For both settings we adopt the model parameter values shown in Table 1 . For each setting we run 250 ns-2 simulations using 5 different TCP traffic loads (each traffic load is run 50 times with flow source and destination pairs selected at random for each run). Traffic is generated for each flow using a CBR (Constant Bit Rate) traffic generator that generates approximately 300 data packets per flow. The network considered is composed of 64 nodes arranged in an 8X8 grid. The communication range is set such that each node has 4 neighbors, with the exception of edge nodes, which have 3 neighbors, and corner nodes, which have 2 neighbors. The network adopts IEEE 802.11 [2] for medium access and AODV [4] for routing. We use false positives and false negatives as defined in [1] as the basis for accuracy evaluation. We observe the decisions made by each node (i.e. 1 H or 0 H ) and examine the false positives and false negative that result from all decisions made by all nodes. 
False Positives
Setting S1
Setting S2 We compare the false positives and false negatives resulting from each setting of the model implementation to the theoretical bounds of α and β . Figure 1 shows that false positives in both settings are bounded by α under all traffic loads. It also shows that false positives are almost identical for both settings. False positives occur when a clean route is identified as infected due to retransmissions on the route. Since the route is actually clean, the value of ) (selfish P Π does not impact retransmissions. Hence, false positives are likely to be the same for a given value of
. With respect to false negatives, Figure 2 shows that settings S1 and S2 are bounded by β . Figure 2 shows that false negatives decrease as the value of ) (selfish P Π increases. A false negative occurs when an infected route is falsely identified as clean because of ACK events observed on the route. As ) (selfish P Π increases the likelihood that an ACK event is observed on an infected route decreases. Hence, false negatives also decrease.
Simulation results show that even though the model parameters are estimated with some error, false negatives and false positives remain bounded by α and β respectively. We noticed that, given a value of ) ( selfish P Π that the system can tolerate, system accuracy increases as
increases. In our simulations, we considered that some routes may be asymmetric. An assessment of the proportion of asymmetric routes in the simulations revealed that between 10%-20% of all routes were constructed asymmetrically by the routing protocol. The accuracy achieved by the model suggests that as long as the proportion of symmetric routes is reasonably high, asymmetric routes have insignificant impact on the model's accuracy. Since routing protocols typically attempt to construct routes symmetrically [4, 5] , it is reasonable to assume that a large proportion of routes will be symmetric. 
VI. DETECTING SELFISH NODES
We now consider identifying selfish nodes from the routes reported as infected by the test. The detection of infected routes does not fully eliminate the impact of misbehavior. To eliminate the impact of misbehavior it is important to detect and react to misbehaving nodes by isolating them from the network, for example. We compare two approaches to detect selfish nodes on infected routes: a centralized approach and a localized one. The centralized approach assumes knowledge of all infected routes in the network, which is the case if a central authority exists to which nodes report routes they identify as infected, or if nodes exchange such information. The localized approach assumes that each node knows only about routes it identified as infected and only knows about its next hop neighbors on these routes. To assess the effectiveness of each approach we use two metrics: exposure (proportion of selfish nodes identified as such) and false positives (proportion of cooperative nodes falsely identified as selfish). Note that a good detection approach should achieve high exposure and low false positives. We assume 5 selfish nodes in the network with
Our results show that it is not possible to get both high exposure and low false positives using the centralized approach. Exposure of 100% was not possible for flows less than 60. At 100% exposure, false positives was at 55.93% at 60 flows, 47.46% at 100 flows, and 79.66% at 200 flows (Figure 3) . On the other hand, 100% exposure was achieved by the localized approach with false positives at 11.48% at 60 flows, 14.97% at 100 flows, and 9.09% at 200 flows (Figure 3) . Hence, a localized approach is a better option (similar conclusion was made using % 100 and % 50 = selfish P ).
VII. RELATED WORK Previous work highlighted the importance of securing ad hoc networks [6, 7] . To address the problem of node misbehavior in ad hoc networks three classes of solutions have been proposed: secure routing protocols ( [3, 8, 9] ), cooperation incentives ( [10, 11] ), and node behavior evaluation ( [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] ). In [17] , a sequential probability ratio test based algorithm was introduced to detect uncooperative behavior at the MAC layer in ad hoc networks. In [18] the problem of misbehavior at the MAC layer is introduced and formulated as a minmax robust sequential detection problem.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we introduced a Sequential Probability Ratio Test (SPRT) to distinguish between infected and clean routes. SPRTs operate faster compared to other test procedures and do not require a predefined number of observations. We demonstrated the accuracy of the test using ns-2 simulations. We then introduced a localized and a centralized approach for the detection of misbehaving nodes on infected routes and showed how the localized approach performs better than the centralized one.
